IF YOUR TOOLBOX CONTAINS ONLY HAMMERS -EVERYTHING LOOKS LIKE A NAIL
Current joint doctrine describes four distinct phases during an operational campaign: 1)
Deter/Engage, 2) Seize Initiative, 3) Decisive Operations and 4) Transition/Post Hostilities. 2 We execute the first three phases quite satisfactorily. The U.S. military can deter aggression and if required, decisively defeat any adversary. Bringing an operational campaign to its successful political conclusion -(i.e., the Transition/Post Hostilities Phase) 3 remains our key barrier.
Tying military means and ways to political ends has progressed little from the Clausewitzian paradigm of bending another nation to our political will or simply conquering it.
Our military's current task is not only to defeat an enemy but restore him to a sovereign, selfsustaining, peaceful member in the international community as well. 4 Nation building is a radical task for an instrument designed for destruction. Termination of war does not equate to the emergence of peace -there is a transition between the two. 5 Military professional study of war termination and the promotion of peace pales compared to the study of deterring and fighting wars. 6 While our diplomatic, economic and informational instruments of power are the best tools for nation building, many claim our joint warfighting superiority has in fact served to atrophy our other instruments of power. 7 The fundamental question is -"Why is the U.S. so ineffectual in tying her superior military, diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of power together and restoring the peace after she has succeeded in vanquishing her adversaries." The answer lies in the nation's inability to combine its military and nonmilitary tools at the operational level. The operational level is where campaigns are planned and executed. Without unity of effort focused on the strategic, political objective -transition to post hostilities will invariably be found wanting. Our floundering in Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans are just examples of our failure to reach our political end state. History shows us we have not always been impotent in providing for lasting peace after military victory. The Northern Army's mission of occupation, and restoration of the South at the end of our civil war was our first successful endeavor at providing for the peace. This was by no means a quick and clean process. The 12 year reconstruction period was one of the most controversial eras in American history, often referred to as the "Age of Hate." Its negative effects have spanned generations. 8 Southern reconstruction was a classical Clausewitzian example of a post-hostilities military operation -subjugation of the Southern States' political will as we enveloped them into our sovereign territory. It does not reflect the political and ideological constraints of the modern era.
The Second World War provides the best example of restoring defeated enemies to stable, peaceful global partners. Both Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan seemed bent on shaping the world into their fiefdoms. Now both nations are models of political and economic viability. The U.S. is primarily responsible for these transformed nations. Panama, a more recent vanquished foe showed little of the political and economic resilience of Japan or
Germany. What is different?
The manner in which we wield the full spectrum of national power has changed. The U.S.
can no longer overlook its nonmilitary instruments as it did in Post World War II. We have become more efficient in integrating our instruments of power. However with that efficiency, we have lost our effectiveness -at least in the operational level. Without closer integration to the nonmilitary instruments at the operational level -the military will remain the wrong tool for building lasting peace.
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF POST HOSTILITY OPERATIONS: GERMANY VERSUS PANAMA
Setting the conditions for lasting peace outweigh the conditions for outright military victory.
The Treaty of Versailles at the conclusion of World War I and its effects leading to World War II demonstrated the consequences of winning war but neglecting peace. 9 Our post hostility and transition efforts after the defeat of Nazi Germany and the Noriega's Panama demonstrate U.S.
adaptations to the phenomenon of winning the peace. They further serve to illustrate the current operational shortfall in military capabilities to smoothly transition from military operations to civil control.
WORLD WAR II: OPERATION ECLIPSE AND THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY
The study of Operation ECLIPSE is especially relevant in transition operations. It was both joint and combined in nature and applied to a completely destroyed German state. Two key distinctions to the Post WW II German model must be kept in mind. First, the scale of conflict and availability of resources to restore a nation are unlikely to occur in the future.
Second is the lack of interagency participation at an operational level. While a model of success in transitioning from war to nation restoration, the military was relatively free to integrate the collective elements of national power without domestic or government agency oversight. President Reagan approved the campaign to allow a unified interagency campaign to exert diplomatic and economic instruments to compel Noriega's removal. The principal agencies included the Defense, State, Justice, Treasury and Commerce departments. 25 This was a new approach in national strategy. There was a clear political objective -the removal of
Noriega -on which all instruments were focused with a more coherent involvement of the interagency community.
During May and June 1989, the NSC created a Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) to synchronize instruments of national power to compel regime change and restore Panamanian stability. However, even with increased interagency involvement in the planning, the PCC's efforts focused on supporting decisive military operations rather than integrated actions aimed at restoring Panama. 26 Post hostility operations remained for the most part an afterthought.
The only significant interagency policy for post hostility operations planning was Rules Of Engagement to prevent damage to infrastructure.
In May 1989, the new CINCSOUTH, General Thurman, significantly changed BLUE SPOON to become more decisive and renamed the campaign plan, JUST CAUSE. This supported newly elected President Bush's more aggressive policy to force a regime change. 
THE EVOLUTION OF INTERAGENCY INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY OPERATIONS
It is important to evaluate the evolution in interagency coordination to determine how we have developed the mechanisms. We must look at the task and purpose of the process to determine a better way to integrate our national instruments at the operational level. Operations." 38 PDD-56 advanced both policy and interagency community mechanisms to synchronize activities in SSCs. PDD-56 directed the NSC to form ad hoc policy coordinating committees (PCCs) to create policy for a particular complex contingency in order to focus national efforts. 39 PDD-56 also created the requirement of a Political-Military (POLMIL) Plan to define and achieve political objectives for a given contingency. 40 The POLMIL plan forces unity of effort by directing governmental organizations to set synchronized conditions to the operational campaign plan. These are strategic level directives that provide only marginally improved operational unity of effort.
Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, volumes I and II, 9 October 1996, addresses interagency community integration. 41 It recognizes interdependence of both the civil agencies' and the military's respective missions and the need to closely coordinate efforts regardless of philosophical and operational differences. 42 JP 3-08 attempted to create procedures to facilitate operational coordination. Its success is limited however, because the CINC is a facilitator rather than an executor in the process. Mutual courses of action and end states would be solicited with the goal of efficiently pooling resources. 43 It stressed that the CINC and his staff would be bound to the Secretary of the Army's policy for domestic operations and the appropriate ambassador(s)' abroad -as well as answering to the Secretary of Defense. 44 The CJCS is the principle link between the CINC and those whom provide strategic policy. JP 3-08 also correctly assumed the NSC and its appropriate PCC would be a significant role player. The CINC would consequently answer to several masters in a much more complex environment.
WHAT'S MISSING IN POLICY AND JOINT DOCTRINE FOR TRANSITION OPERATIONS
Direct access at the operational level to policy coordination has been further removed by the facade of integration mechanisms. PDD-56 and emerging joint doctrine started integration of national instruments of power to achieve unity of effort in SSC's. They have not gone far enough. PDD-56 does not, nor did it intend to apply to combat operations. 45 Even if applied to a wartime campaign construct, the changing makeup of the PCCs as an ad hoc organization tailored to a specific contingency makes it extremely cumbersome for the CINC to obtain consistent guidance throughout the campaign. This changing membership of a policy-creating organization and consequent shift in methodology of individual committees require constant dialogue with the CINC and his staff to maintain a productive relationship at the strategic and operational levels. The CINC is limited in this ability as it is currently the role of the CJCS to "represent the concerns of the combatant commander in the NSC." 46 Furthermore, doctrine based on presidential decision authority is short-sighted. What happens if the current or future Presidents decide to do away with the decision? How does the CINC access policy guidance then?
Joint doctrine development has only added levels of efficiency to a fundamentally inefficient system. It focuses on coordination to effect the interagency processes in the attempt to achieve unity of effort. Joint doctrine is one-sided policy only -applicable to the military exclusively. JP 3-08 is sufficiently vague in its structure and consistency and some argue that the "take charge" military culture steps in to fill those voids. 47 This approach is culturally counterproductive in the long term.
There is perhaps a more dangerous development caused by the patterns of political and 
SOLUTION: CREATE AN OPERATIONAL INTERAGENCY CELL ON THE CINC'S STAFF.
PCC's and their strategic policy decisions work to create broad, integrated plans for the interagency community. Their effectiveness deteriorate at the operational level. Strategic policy is too cumbersome to adapt to the fog of war and a rapidly changing environment caused by a thinking enemy. The CINC must have access to policy making mechanisms as much as practical to synchronize all instruments toward the campaign. Ideally, an operational campaign will best succeed under unity of command. However it is politically unlikely to allow military complete control over the interagency community at the operational level.
There must be a mechanism which could integrate the civilian agencies with the military at the operational level. This concept requires an organization specifically established to combine all elements of national power at the theater level where operational campaigns are planned and executed. There are two alternative strategies to create such a mechanism.
The first strategy is to create a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) with the capacity for interagency coordination of operational planning matters. 49 The JIACG would be an Additionally, the operational interagency cell could enlist specific non-standing agency members necessary for a specific contingency.
ROLES OF THE OPERATIONAL INTERAGENCY DIRECTORATE
The principle role of the directorate would be to produce Phase IV, POLMIL Plan (Post The potential for synchronization increases dramatically.
CONCLUSION
Our political leadership has increasingly used the military to achieve predominately nonmilitary objectives, exposing a fundamental, operational flaw in American campaigning.
That flaw is being able to coherently tie military and nonmilitary instruments to the overarching political objective in any war -setting conditions for a lasting peace and the end of hostilities.
As the U.S. pursued more ideological interests of promoting democracy, ending human suffering and bringing regional stability, we discovered that the military, as efficient as it is in fighting and winning our nation's wars, was a clumsy instrument in this new arena. "The object in war is to attain a better peace...Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after-effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war....never lose sight of the post-war prospect in chasing the 'mirage of victory.'"
